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Abstract
Auditing fairness of decision-makers is now in high demand. To respond to this social
demand, several fairness auditing tools have been developed. The focus of this study is to
raise an awareness of the risk of malicious decision-makers who fake fairness by abusing the
auditing tools and thereby deceiving the social communities. The question is whether such a
fraud of the decision-maker is detectable so that the society can avoid the risk of fake fairness.
In this study, we answer this question negatively. We specifically put our focus on a situation
where the decision-maker publishes a benchmark dataset as the evidence of his/her fairness and
attempts to deceive a person who uses an auditing tool that computes a fairness metric. To
assess the (un)detectability of the fraud, we explicitly construct an algorithm, the stealthily
biased sampling, that can deliberately construct an evil benchmark dataset via subsampling.
We show that the fraud made by the stealthily based sampling is indeed difficult to detect both
theoretically and empirically.
1 Introduction
Background Machine learning models are being increasingly used in individuals’ consequential
decisions such as loan, insurance, and employment. In such applications, the models are required to
be fair in the sense that their outputs should be irrelevant to the individuals’ sensitive feature such
as gender, race, and religion [20]. Several efforts have been devoted to establishing mathematical
formulation of fairness [8, 13, 9] and to propose algorithms that meet the fairness criteria [5, 10, 14].
With increasing attention to fairness, social communities now require to audit systems that
incorporate machine learning algorithms to prevent unfair decisions. For example, a 2014 White
House Report [22] mentioned “[t]he increasing use of algorithms to make eligibility decisions must
be carefully monitored for potential discriminatory outcomes for disadvantaged groups, even absent
discriminatory intent”. A similar statement also appeared in a 2016 White House Report [19].
To respond to the above social request, several fairness auditing tools have been developed [1,
4, 23]. These tools help the decision-maker to investigate the fairness of their system by, e.g.,
computing several fairness metrics [23], measuring the significance of the system inputs [1], and
identifying minority groups with unfair treatments [4]. If the decision-maker found unfairness in
their systems, she/he can then fix the systems by inspecting the causes of unfairness.
These auditing tools are also useful for promoting fairness of the decision-maker’s system to the
social communities. For promoting fairness of the system, the decision-maker publishes the outputs
of the auditing tools. If the outputs suggest no unfairness in the system, the fact can be seen as an
evidence of the system’s fairness. The decision-maker thus can appeal fairness of their system by
publishing the fact to earn the trust of the social communities.
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Risk of Fake Fairness The focus of this study is to raise awareness of the potential risk of
malicious decision-makers who fake fairness. If the decision-maker is malicious, he may control the
auditing tools’ results so that his system looks fair for the social communities even if the system
is indeed unfair. Such a risk is avoidable if the social communities can detect the decision-maker’s
fraud. Therefore, the question is whether such a fraud is detectable. In this study, we answer this
question negatively. That is, the fraud is very difficult to detect in practice, which indicates that
the society is now facing a potential risk of fake fairness. In what follows, we refer to a person who
attempts to detect the decision-maker’s fraud as a detector.
If the decision-maker only publishes the auditing tools’ outputs, the detectability of the decision-
maker’s fraud is considerably low. That is, the malicious decision-maker may modify the auditing
tools’ outputs arbitrary, whereas the detector has no way to certify whether or not the outputs are
modified. This concludes that the decision-maker who only publishes the auditing tools’ outputs
might be untrustable.
The decision-maker should publish more information about their system in addition to the au-
diting tools’ outputs to acquire the social communities’ trust. However, because the system’s infor-
mation usually involves some confidential information, the decision-maker wants to prove fairness
by publishing minimal information about their system.
In this study, we investigate a decision-maker who attempts to prove the fairness of their system
by constructing a benchmark dataset. That is, the decision-maker publishes a subset of his dataset
with his decisions as minimal information for proving the fairness of the system. Given the benchmark
dataset with the decisions, the detector can confirm the fairness of the system by using the auditing
tools. In particular, we focus our attention on an auditing tool that computes a fairness metric.
With this setup, we assess the detectability of the decision-maker’s fraud.
Biased Sampling Attack With the setup above, we consider a type of decision-maker’s attacking
algorithm, biased sampling attack. In the biased sampling attack, an attacker has a dataset D
obtained from an underlying distribution P . Here, the dataset D involves the decisions made by
the decision-makers’ system, which are possibly unfair. The attacker deliberately selects a subset
Z ⊆ D as the benchmark dataset so that the value of the fairness metric for Z is within a fair level.
Then, the detector who employs an auditing tool that computes the fairness metric cannot detect
unfairness of the decision-maker’s system.
The simplest method of the biased sampling attack might be case-control sampling [17]. If the
sensitive information is gender (man or woman) and the decision is binary (positive or negative), this
method classifies the dataset into four classes: (man, positive), (woman, positive), (man, negative),
and (woman, negative). Then, it samples the desired numbers of points from the classes. By
controlling the number of points in each class appropriately, it produces a fair subset Z.
Fortunately, the fraud of the case-control sampling could be detected as follows. The detector
compares the distribution of the benchmark dataset Z with her prior knowledge (e.g., distributions
of ages or zip-codes). Then, because the case-control samples involve a bias from the original
distribution, the detector may discover some unnatural thing, which indicates the decision-maker’s
fraud in the data-revealing process.
To hide the fraud, the malicious decision-maker will select fair subset Z whose distribution looks
similar to that ofD. We refer to such a subset as stealthily biased subset and the problem of sampling
such a subset as stealthily biased sampling. Intuitively, the problem is formulated as follows. The
mathematical formulation of the problem is given in Section 3.
Problem 1 (Stealthily biased sampling problem (informal)). Given a possibly unfair dataset D
obtained from an underlying distribution P , sample subset Z ⊆ D such that (i) Z is fair in terms of
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some fairness criteria, and (ii) the distinguishing of the distribution of Z from P is difficult.
Our Contributions In this study, we develop an algorithm for the stealthily biased sampling
problem and demonstrate its difficulty of detection.
First, we formulate the stealthily biased sampling problem as a Wasserstein distance minimiza-
tion problem. We show that this problem is reduced to the minimum-cost flow problem and solved
it in polynomial time. (Section 3)
Second, we show the difficulty of the detection of the proposed algorithm. We introduce an ideal
detector who can access the underlying distribution P and compares the distribution of Z and P
by a statistical test. The ideal detector has full information to perform the previously-mentioned
fraud detection procedure, and any realistic detector cannot have such access. Therefore, if the ideal
detector cannot detect the fraud, we can conclude that any realistic detector either cannot detect
the fraud. We prove that the Wasserstein distance is an upper-bound of the advantage, which is a
distinguishability measure used in the cryptographic theory [11], with respect to the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov statistical test (KS test) [18] (Theorem 4). This means that the proposed algorithm is hard
to detect even if the ideal detector uses the KS test. (Section 4)
Finally, through synthetic and real-world data experiments, we show that the decision-maker
can indeed pretend to be fair by using the stealthily biased sampling. Specifically, we demonstrate
that the detector cannot detect the fraud of the decision-maker. In the experiments, we investigate
detectability against a detector who can access an independent observation from P but cannot
P . This detector is also ideal but more practical than the detector introduced in Section 4. The
experimental results thus show more practical detectability than the theoretically analyzed one.
(Section 5)
2 Preliminaries
Wasserstein Distance Let V be a finite set, and µ, ν : V → R≥0 be measures on V . A measure π
on V ×V is a coupling measure of µ and ν if µi =
∑
j∈V πij , and νj =
∑
i∈V πij , which is denoted
by π ∈ ∆(µ, ν). Let (X , d) be a metric space, i.e., d : X ×X → R is positive definite, symmetric, and
satisfies the triangle inequality. Suppose that each i ∈ V has feature xi ∈ X on the metric space.
Then, the Wasserstein distance between µ and ν, denoted by W (µ, ν), is defined by the optimal
value of the following optimization problem [24]:
min
∑
i,j∈V
d(xi, xj)πij , s.t. π ∈ ∆(µ, ν). (2.1)
The Wasserstein distance is computed in polynomial time by reducing to the minimum-cost flow
problem or using the Sinkhorn iteration [21].
Minimum-Cost Flow Let G = (V , E) be a directed graph, where V is the vertices, E is the edges,
c : E → R is the capacity, and a : E → R is the cost. The minimum-cost flow problem is given by
min
∑
e∈E
a(e)f(e)
s.t. 0 ≤ f(e) ≤ c(e), e ∈ E ,
∑
e∈δ+(u)
f(e)−
∑
e∈δ−(u)
f(e) =


0, u ∈ V \ {s, t},
d, u = s,
−d, u = t,
(2.2)
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where δ+(u) = {(u, v) ∈ E} and δ−(v) = {(u, v) ∈ E} are the outgoing edges from u and the
incoming edges to v, respectively. d ≥ 0 is the required amount of the flow. This problem is solvable
in O˜(E
√
V) time in theory [16], where O˜ suppresses log factors. The practical evaluation of the
minimum-cost flow algorithms are given in the study by [15].
3 Algorithm for Stealthily Biased Sampling
We formulate the stealthily biased sampling problem as a Wasserstein distance minimization problem.
The difficulty of detecting the stealthily biased sampling is studied in Section 4. Here, we present a
formulation for “categorical biasing,” which controls the number of points in each category. Another
biasing method for quantitative biasing is presented in Appendix A.
Problem Formulation Let X be a metric space for the feature space and Y be a finite set
representing the outcome of the decisions. An entry of x ∈ X corresponds to a sensitive information;
let S be a finite set representing the class of sensitive information, and let s : X → S be the mapping
that extracts the sensitive information from the feature.
The dataset is given by D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xN , yN)}, where xi ∈ X is the feature of the i-th
point and yi ∈ Y is the decision of the i-th point. For simplicity, we write i ∈ D for (xi, yi) ∈ D.
Let ν be the uniform measure on D, whose expected number of points is K, i.e., νi =
K
N , (i ∈ D).
This is our reference distribution, i.e., if the decision-maker is not cheating, he will disclose subset
Z ⊆ D following this distribution, i.e., P(i ∈ S) = νi, where P denotes the probability.
However, as the decision-maker wants to show that the output is fair, he constructs another
distribution µ. Similar to the case-control sampling discussed in Section 1, we classify the dataset
into bins S×Y, and control the expected number of points sampled from each bin. Let k : S×Y → Z
be the number of points of the bins, where K =
∑
s∈S,y∈Y k(s, y) ≤ |D|. Then, µ satisfies the
requirement if
∑
(xi,yi)∈D:s(xi)=s,yi=y
µi = k(s, y), (s ∈ S, y ∈ Y). (3.1)
We denote by µ ∈ P (k) if µ satisfies the above constraint. Note that by choosing k appropriately,
we can show that Z is fair, thus meeting the first requirement in Problem 1.
To meet the second requirement in Problem 1, the decision-maker must determine distribution
µ such that µ is indistinguishable from reference distribution ν. Here, we propose to measure the
indistinguishability by using the Wasserstein distance. Then, the stealthily biased sampling problem
is mathematically formulated as follows.
Problem 2 (Stealthily biased sampling problem (formal)). minW (µ, ν), s.t. µ ∈ P (k).
By substituting the definition of the Wasserstein distance into Problem 2, we obtain
min
∑
i,j∈D
d(xi, xj)πij , s.t. π ∈ ∆(µ, ν), µ ∈ P (k). (3.2)
As the objective function is linear in π and both ∆(µ, ν) and P (k) are polytopes, Problem 3.2 is a
linear programming problem, hence is solved in a polynomial time [12].
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Figure 3.1: Flow network for biased sampling. (c, a) on the edge if it has capacity c and cost a.
Efficient Algorithm To establish an efficient algorithm for the stealthily biased sampling problem,
we reduce the problem to a minimum-cost flow problem.
We construct the network G = (V , E) in Figure 3.1 with capacity c and cost a. Vertices V consist
of the following five classes: (i) supersource s, (ii) case-controlling vertices usy for all s ∈ S and
y ∈ Y, (iii) left vertices li for all i ∈ D, (iv) right vertices rj for all j ∈ D, and (v) supersink t.
Edges E consist of the following four classes: (i’) (s, usy) for all s ∈ S and y ∈ Y, whose cost is 0
and capacity is k(s, y), (ii’) (usy, li) for all i ∈ D with s(xi) = s and yi = y, whose cost is 0 and
capacity is one, (iii’) (li, rj) for all i ∈ D and j ∈ D, whose cost is d(xi, xj) and capacity is ∞, and
(iv’) (rj , t) for all j ∈ D, whose cost is 0 and capacity is K/N .
By setting the flow amount to K, the solution to the above instance gives the solution to the
stealthily biased sampling problem, where πij is the flow across edge (li, rj), and µi is the flow across
edge (us(xi)yi , li). As |V| = O(|D|) and |E| = O(|D|2), the problem is solvable in O˜(|D|2.5) time [16].
4 Stealthiness of Sampling
We theoretically confirm that the stealthily biased sampling is difficult to detect. Recall that the
decision-maker’s purpose is to make distribution µ indistinguishable from the uniform distribution
ν. To measure the indistinguishability, we introduce advantage, which is used in cryptographic
theory [11].
Let νK be K product distribution of a sample drawn from the uniform probability distribution,
and let µK be K product distribution of a sample generated by our stealthily biased sampling
algorithm. To define the advantage, let us consider the following game in which a detector attempts
to distinguish µK and νK : (1). Flip an unbiased coin. (2). If a head outcome is achieved, the
decision-maker reveals D ∼ µK to the detector; otherwise, the decision-maker reveals D ∼ νK
to the detector. (3). The detector estimates the side of the flipped coin. If the probability that
the detector estimates the outcome of the unbiased coin correctly is near 1/2, the detector cannot
distinguish whether the obtained samples are biased.
Let H be a random variable such that P(H = 1) = P(H = 0) = 1/2, which represents the flipped
unbiased coin. The detector’s estimation algorithm is a mapping Φ from D to {0, 1}, where the
output is 1 if the detector expects that the samples are drawn from νK ; otherwise, the output is
0. The probability that the detector detects bias correctly is obtained as P(Φ(D) = H), where the
randomness comes from flipped coin H and dataset D. Then, the advantage is defined as follows:
Adv(Φ;µK , νK) =
∣∣P(Φ(D) = H)− 12 ∣∣ . (4.1)
A smaller Adv value implies that biased distribution µK is more difficult to distinguish from νK
against a detector with the test algorithm Φ.
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Stealthiness against Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test To assess the difficulty of detecting the
stealthily biased sampling, we consider an ideal detector who can access the underlying distribu-
tion ν. Here, we analyze the advantage when the ideal detector who uses the KS test.
The KS test is a goodness-of-fit test for real-valued samples. Let Fν be the cumulative distribution
function of distribution ν, and let FK be the cumulative distribution function of the empirical
measure of the obtained samples. Then, the KS statistic is defined as KS(D; ν) = supx |FK(x) −
Fν(x)|. The KS test is rejected if KS(D; ν) is larger than an appropriate threshold.
Let us consider the detector’s algorithms based on the KS statistic. We formally define a
detector’s algorithm that returns 1 if the KS statistic is larger than threshold τ as ΦKS,τ (D) =
I(KS(D; ν) > τ), where I is the indicator function.
We analyze the advantage against ΦKS,τ under a flatness assumption on sample distribution ν.
For x ∈ X , let Bǫ(x) be the ǫ-ball centered at x. Then, the flatness assumption is defined as follows:
Assumption 3. There exist constants s, C > 0 such that for any ǫ > 0, supx∈X ν(Bǫ(x)) ≤ (ǫ/C)s.
Many natural distributions on a real line satisfy Assumption 3. For example, the one-dimensional
normal distribution satisfies Assumption 3 with s = 1 and C =
√
2/π.
Under the flatness assumption on ν, we reveal an upper bound on the advantage against the KS
test in the categorical biasing setting. Let M be the number of pair types of decision and sensitive
attribute. Let κ and κ′ be the distribution over pairs of decision and sensitive attribute on the
sample distribution and biased distribution. Then, we reveal the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let W (µK , νK) be the Wasserstein distance equipped with the distance d(D,D′) =
mini=1,...,K d(xi, x
′
i) for D = {x1, ..., xK} and D′ = {x′1, ..., x′K}. Under Assumption 3, for threshold
τ ≥ (C/K)1/s/2, we have
Adv(ΦKS,τ ;µ
K , νK) ≤ K1/sW (µK ,νK)/C1/s + 4K! ((1+TV(κ,κ′))/K)K , (4.2)
where s and C are the constants from Assumption 3, TV(κ, κ′) =
∑M
i |κi − κ′i|/2 is the total
variation distance.
The proof of this theorem can be found in the supplementary material. Since 1 + TV(κ, κ′) < e
and K! ∼ (K/e)K , the second term in (4.2) is o(1) and is dominated by the first term. Because
the stealthily biased sampling minimizes the Wasserstein distance (i.e., the first term of (4.2)), it
also minimizes the upper-bound of the advantage. This implies that the stealthily biased sampling
is difficult to detect for the ideal detector. Consequently, for any realistic detector who has less
information than the ideal one, it is even more difficult to detect the stealthily biased sampling.
5 Experiments
In this section, we show that the stealthily biased sampling is indeed difficult to detect, through
experiments on synthetic data and two real-world data (COMPAS and Adult).1 In the exper-
iments, we adopted the demographic parity (DP) [6] as the fairness metric for auditing. Here,
let s ∈ {0, 1} be a sensitive feature and y ∈ {0, 1} be a decision. The DP is then defined as
DP = |P(y = 1 | s = 1)− P(y = 1 | s = 0)|. A large DP indicates that the decision is unfair because
the decision-maker favors providing positive decisions to one group over the other group.
1The codes can be found at https://github.com/sato9hara/stealthily-biased-sampling
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Summary of the Results Before moving to each experiment, we summarize the main results
here. In the experiments, we investigated detectability of the decision-makers’ fraud against an ideal
detector who can access an independent observation D′ from the underlying distribution P . In all
the experiments, we verified the following three points.
R1. Both the stealthily biased and case-control sampling could reduce the DP of the sampled set
Z.
R2. The stealthily biased sampling was more resistant against the detector’s fraud detection com-
pared to the case-control sampling. Specifically, the stealthily biased sampling marked low
scores of the fraud detection criteria for a wide range of the experimental settings.
R3. In all the experiments, the decision-makers successfully pretended to be fair. They could select
a subset Z with small DPs and small fraud detection criteria.
Implementation We used Python 3 for data processing. In all the experiments, we used the
squared Euclidean distance d(xi, xj) = ‖xi − xj‖2 as the metric in Wasserstein distance. To solve
the minimum-cost flow problem (3.2), we used the network simplex method implemented in LEMON
Graph Library.2 With LEMON, the problem could be solved in a few seconds for the datasets with
the size N up to a few thousand. For the Adult dataset, we used a bootstrap-type estimator to
improve the computational scalability (see Appendix C for the detail).
5.1 Synthetic Example
Example 5 (Loan check). Consider a decision-maker who decides to lend money (y = 1) or not
(y = 0) based on the applicants sensitive feature s ∈ {0, 1} (e.g., gender) and a d-dimensional
feature vector x ∈ [0, 1]d, where first feature x1 is an income. Here, we model the criteria of the
decision-maker as
y = I(x1 + bs > 0.5), (5.1)
where b ≥ 0 is a constant. Note that this decision-maker is unfair if b 6= 0.
To pretend to be a fair, for a set of individual’s feature, sensitive feature, and the decision
D = {(xi, si, yi)}Ni=1, the decision-maker selects subset Z ⊆ D as evidence that the decisions are fair.
We solve this problem by using both the stealthily biased and case-control sampling.
Data We set the underlying data distribution P as follows. We sampled sensitive feature s with
P(s = 1) = 0.5, and sampled feature vector x in a uniformly random manner over [0, 1]d with
d = 1.3 Decision y is made by following the criteria (5.1). We sampled dataset D with N = 1, 000
observations from the underlying distribution P . We set the parameters in the criteria (5.1) to be
b = 0.2. Thus, the DP of the decision-maker is 0.2.
Attacker To reduce the DP through sampling, the sampled set needs to satisfy P(y = 1 | s = 1) ≈
P(y = 1 | s = 0) ≈ α for a predetermined ratio of positive decisions α ∈ [0, 1]. The expected number
of sampling in each bin (s, y) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} is then determined by k(s, y) = ⌈0.5Kαy(1− α)1−y⌉
(recall that P(s) = 0.5, ∀s ∈ {0, 1}).
Detector As a detector, we adopted the Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample test. The detector has
an independent observation D′ = {(x′j , s′j)}200j=1 as a referential dataset sampled from underlying
2https://lemon.cs.elte.hu/trac/lemon
3Results for higher dimensional settings were almost the same as d = 1. See Appendix D.1.
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Figure 5.1: Results for the decision-maker with a = 0.2. The shaded regions in (a) denotes the
average DP ± std. The shaded regions in (b)–(d) denote 95% confidence intervals. The dotted line
in (b)–(d) denotes the significance level 0.05.
distribution P . Here, we note that the detector has no access to decision y for D′ because the
decision criteria (5.1) is not disclosed. Given Z, the detector applies the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
two-sample test to detect whether the distribution of S is different from that of referential set
D′. Here, we consider the strongest detector: we assume that she knows that only income x1 is
used in x for the decision. We denote the distribution of income x1 in Z and D
′ by PS(x1) and
PD′(x1), respectively. The detector can then use the Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample test
4 in
three ways: (i) test PS(x1) = PD′(x1), (ii) test PS(x1 | s = 1) = PD′(x1 | s = 1), and (iii) test
PS(x1 | s = 0) = PD′(x1 | s = 0). In the experiment, we set the significance level of the test to be
0.05.
Result We selected a subset Z ⊆ D with size |Z| = 200 using both the stealthily biased and case-
control sampling. We repeated the experiment 100 times, and summarized the results in Figure 5.1,
for several different ratios of positive decisions α. As we summarized earlier, three key observations
R1, R2, and R3 can be found in the figures.
R1. Figure 1(a) shows that both the stealthily biased and case-control sampling successfully reduced
DP to less than 0.1 through sampling the subset Z. We note that no significant differences were
observed in DPs between the two sampling methods.
R2. Figures 1(b), 1(c), and 1(d) show that the stealthily biased sampling was more resistant to the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, compared to the case-control sampling. Specifically, the stealthily biased
sampling attained a small rejection rate in a wide range of α in the sampling process.
R3. By using the stealthily biased sampling, the decision-maker successfully pretended to be fair.
4In practice, the detector does not know that x1 is a key feature. Thus, the detector needs to use the two-sample
test for multi-dimensional data. However, in our preliminary experiments, we found that multi-dimensional tests have
very low detection powers. Therefore, we used an advantageous setting for the detector.
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By setting α in the sampling to be 0.6, none of the tests could confidently reject that disclosed
dataset Z is different from the referential dataset D′. For α = 0.6, the rejection rates of all the
three tests were kept around 0.05, which is exactly the same as the significance level. These results
indicate that the detector cannot detect the fraud made by the stealthily biased sampling: the DP
of Z is small, and its distribution is sufficiently natural so that the statistical test cannot reject it.
The case-control sampling showed higher rejection rates in tests of P(x | s = 1) and P(x | s = 0),
and thus was outperformed by the stealthily biased sampling.
Lastly, we note that the stochastic decision-maker can be far more evil than the deterministic
decision-maker considered in this section. See Appendix D.2 for the detail.
5.2 Real-World Data: COMPAS
For the first real-world data experiment, we focus on the COMPAS dataset [3].5 The COMPAS
dataset contains several defendant’s records obtained from the Broward County Sheriff’s Office in
Florida. Each defendant is scored his or her risk of recidivism using a software called COMPAS.
ProPublica [3] revealed that the COMPAS risk score is discriminative: it tends to score white
defendants with low scores while scoring black defendants with high scores.
Because Florida had strong open-records laws, the entire COMPAS dataset was made public,
and the bias in the COMPAS risk score was revealed. Here, we consider a virtual scenario that
the decision-maker was aware of the bias in the risk score, and he wants to pretend to be fair by
hiding the bias. To attain this goal, the decision-maker discloses a subset of the COMPAS dataset
as evidence that the COMPAS risk score is fair.
Data We used the same data preprocessing following the analysis of ProPublica [3], which results in
eight features x ∈ R8 of each defendant, with race as sensitive attribute s ∈ {0(black), 1(white)}, and
the decision y ∈ {0(low-risk), 1(middle/high-risk)}. The preprocessed data includes 5, 278 records,
which we randomly held out 1, 278 records as the referential dataset D′ for the detector. From the
remaining 4, 000 records D, we sampled 2, 000 records as Z using both the stealthily biased and
case-control sampling. To reduce the DP in the sampling, we required the sampled set to satisfy
P(y = 1 | s = 1) ≈ P(y = 1 | s = 0) ≈ α for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Detector The detector tries to detect the bias in the disclosed dataset Z by comparing its dis-
tribution with the referential dataset D′. In the experiment, we adopted the Wasserstein distance
(WD) as the detector’s detection criteria.6 If the WD between Z and D′ is sufficiently large, the
detector can detect the bias in Z, and thus the fraud of the decision-maker is revealed.
Result We repeated the experiment 100 times by randomly changing the data splitting, and
summarized the results in Figure 5.2.7 As the baseline without any biased sampling, we computed
DP and the WD for randomly sampled records from D, which are denoted as Baseline in the figures.
The figures show the clear success of the stealthily biased sampling, as we summarized in R1, R2, and
R3. In Figure 5.2(a), with the stealthily biased sampling, the DPs of Z have reduced significantly
(R1). In Figures 5.2(b), the WDs between Z and D′ were sufficiently small for α = 0.6 so that they
are completely indistinguishable from the baselines (R3). The case-control sampling had higher
WDs, and it was thus easier for the detector to detect (R2).
5https://github.com/propublica/compas-analysis
6In COMPAS and Adult experiments, we did not adopt the multi-dimensional two-sample tests because they were
too weak.
7Here, we measured the WD on P(x). The WD on P(x | s = 1) and P(x | s = 0) can be found in Appendix E.2.
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Figure 5.2: Results for the COMPAS dataset: The shaded regions in (a) denotes the average DP ±
std. The shaded regions in (b) denote the average WD ± std.
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Figure 5.3: Results for the Adult dataset: The shaded regions in (a) denotes the average DP ± std.
The shaded regions in (b) denote the average WD ± std.
5.3 Real-World Data: Adult
As the second real-world data experiment, we used the Adult dataset [7]. The Adult dataset contains
48,842 records with several individual’s features and their labels (high-income or low-income). The
dataset is known to include gender bias: in the dataset, while 30% of the male have high-income,
only 10% of the female have high-income. The DP of the dataset is therefore 0.2. If we naively train
a classifier using the dataset, the resulting classifier inherits the bias and becomes discriminative,
i.e., the classifier favors to classify males as high-income. The goal of this experiment is to show that
as if the biased classifier is fair by disclosing a part of the dataset with classifier’s decision.
Data & Classifier In the data preprocessing, we converted categorical features to numerical
features.8 We randomly split 10,000 records for the training set, 20,000 records for the test set, and
the remaining 18,842 records for the referential set D′ for the detector. In the experiment, we first
train a classifier using the training set. As a classifier, we used logistic regression and random forest
with 100 trees. We labeled all the records in the test set using the trained classifier and obtained
the dataset D with the classifier’s decision. We then sample the subset Z ⊆ D with size |Z| = 2, 000
using both the stealthily biased and case-control sampling. To reduce the DP in the sampling, we
required the sampled set to satisfy P(y = 1 | s = 1) ≈ P(y = 1 | s = 0) ≈ α for a predetermined
ratio of positive decisions α ∈ [0, 1].
Detector We adopted the same detector as the COMPAS data experiment, who refers to the WD
as the bias detection metric.
8We used the implementation used in https://www.kaggle.com/kost13/us-income-logistic-regression/notebook
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Result We repeated the experiment 100 times by randomly changing the data splitting, and
summarized the resultsf for logistic regression in Figure 5.3.9 As the baseline, we computed the DP
and the WD for randomly sampled 2, 000 sampled records from D, which is denoted as Baseline
in the figure. Similar to the results of COMPAS, the figures again show the clear success of the
stealthily biased sampling (R1, R2, and R3).
6 Conclusion
We assessed the risk of malicious decision-makers who try to deceive auditing tools, by investigating
the detectability of the decision-maker’s fraud. We specifically put our focus on an auditing tool
that computes a fairness metric. To assess the (un)detectability of the fraud, we considered the
biased sampling attack, where the decision-maker publishes a benchmark dataset as the evidence of
his or her fairness. In this study, we demonstrated the undetectability by explicitly constructing an
algorithm, the stealthily based sampling, that can deliberately construct a fair benchmark dataset.
To derive the algorithm, we formulated the sampling problem as a Wasserstein distance minimization,
which we reduced to a minimum-cost flow problem for efficient computation. We then showed that
the fraud made by the stealthily based sampling is indeed difficult to detect both theoretically and
empirically.
A recent study of [2] has shown that malicious decision-makers can rationalize their unfair de-
cisions by generating seemingly fair explanations, which indicates that an explanation will not be
effective for certifying fairnesses. Our results indicate that passing the auditing tools will not be
sufficient as the evidence of the fairness as well. Assessing the validity of other auditing tools and
mechanisms against malicious decision-makers would be essential.
Lastly, in this study, we revealed the difficulty of detecting decision-maker’s fraud. While audit-
ing tools are getting popular, we will need additional social mechanisms that certify the reported
results of these tools. We hope that our study opens up new research directions for practical social
mechanisms that can certify fairnesses.
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Appendix
A Quantitative Biasing
In the main body of the paper, we show a method for categorical biasing. Here, we show that the
quantitative bias can also be included.
Imagine that the sensitive attribute is quantitative (e.g., the height of a person). In this case, the
fair decision must satisfy that the expected value of the sensitive attribute in each category y ∈ Y
is the same. Let γ be the expected value of the sensitive attribute among the dataset. Then, this
constraint is given by
γ − ǫ ≤
∑
i∈D:yi=y
s(xi)µi ≤ γ + ǫ, (y ∈ Y). (A.1)
We denote this constraint µ ∈ P (γ). Then, the stealthily biased sampling problem is given as follows.
Problem 6 (Stealthily biased sampling problem (Quantitative bias)).
min W (µ, ν)
s.t. µ ∈ P (γ). (A.2)
By substituting the definition of the Wasserstein distance, the above problem is reduced to the
following linear programming problem.
min
∑
i,j∈V d(xi, xj)πij
s.t. π ∈ ∆(µ, ν), µ ∈ P (γ). (A.3)
The problem is solved using the ellipsoid method or the alternating direction method of multiplier
(ADMM) with minimum-cost flow computations.
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The advantage can be rewritten as
Adv(Φ;µK , νK)
=
∣∣PD∼µK (Φ(D) = 1)− PD∼νK (Φ(D) = 1)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
I(Φ(D) = 1)µK(dD)−
∫
I(Φ(D) = 1)νK(dD)
∣∣∣∣ .
Let us approximate the function D → I(Φ(D) = 1). Let ∂Φ be the boundary across which the
output of Φ is changed from 0 or 1 to 1 or 0. For D, let d(D, ∂Φ) = infD′∈∂Φ d(D,D
′), where
d(D,D′) = mini=1,...,K d(xi, x
′
i) for D = (x1, ..., xK) and D
′ = (x′1, ..., x
′
K). For ǫ > 0, define
I˜ǫ(D) =


I(Φ(D) = 1) if d(D, ∂Φ) ≥ ǫ,
1
2 + d(D, ∂Φ) if Φ(D) = 1,
1
2 − d(D, ∂Φ) if Φ(D) = 0.
(B.1)
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Then, the advantage is approximated as
Adv(Φ;µK , νK) ≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
I˜ǫ(dµ
K − dνK)
∣∣∣∣
+ PD∼µK (d(D, ∂Φ) ≤ ǫ) + PD∼νK (d(D, ∂Φ) ≤ ǫ). (B.2)
By definition, I˜ǫ is a 2ǫ-Lipschitz function. Hence, from Kantorovich–Rubenstein duality of 1-
Wasserstein distance, we have
∣∣∣∣
∫
I˜ǫ(dµ
K − dνK)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ W (µ
K , νK)
2ǫ
. (B.3)
Let us consider the condition under which ΦKS,τ (D) = 1. Let I1, ..., IK be intervals such that
Fµ(x) ∈ [(i − 1)/K, i/K] for any x ∈ Ii. For an interval I, let Iǫ = {x : infx′∈I |x − x′| ≤ ǫ}. Then,
ΦKS,τ (D) = 1 if and only if x(i) ∈ (Ii)τ for all i = 1, ...,K, where x(1), ..., x(K) be the ordered samples
such that x(1) ≤ ... ≤ x(K).
Let xlow,i = inf{x ∈ (Ii)τ} and xup,i = sup{x ∈ (Ii)τ}. Then, we have
PD∼νK (d(D, ∂Φ) ≤ ǫ) (B.4)
= PD∼νK
(∀i,min{|x(i) − xlow,i|, |x(i) − xup,i|} ≤ ǫ) . (B.5)
If ǫ ≤ τ , the event ∀i,min{|x(i) − xlow,i|, |x(i) − xup,i|} ≤ ǫ is equivalent to either
∀i = 1, ...,K, |x(i) − xlow,i| ≤ ǫ, (B.6)
or
∀i = 1, ...,K, |x(i) − xup,i| ≤ ǫ, (B.7)
because xlow,i − ǫ ≥ xup,i−1 + ǫ and xup,i−1 − ǫ ≥ xlow,i + ǫ for i = 2, ...,K.
Let us derive a bound on the probability that the event Eq. B.6 occurs. It can be bounded by
P(∃i, x1 ∈ B2ǫ(xlow,i)) (B.8)
P(∃i, x1 /∈ B2ǫ(xlow,i), x2 ∈ B2ǫ(xlow,i)) (B.9)
P(∃i, x1, x2 /∈ B2ǫ(xlow,i), x3 ∈ B2ǫ(xlow,i))... (B.10)
Similarly, the probability that the event Eq. B.7 occurs can be bounded by
P(∃i, x1 ∈ B2ǫ(xup,i)) (B.11)
P(∃i, x1 /∈ B2ǫ(xup,i), x2 ∈ B2ǫ(xup,i)) (B.12)
P(∃i, x1, x2 /∈ B2ǫ(xup,i), x3 ∈ B2ǫ(xup,i))... (B.13)
Hence, under D ∼ µK , we have
P((B.6)) ≤K!
K∏
i=1
µ(B2ǫ(xlow,i)), (B.14)
P((B.7)) ≤K!
K∏
i=1
µ(B2ǫ(xup,i)). (B.15)
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Similarly, under D ∼ νK , we have
P((B.6)) ≤K!
K∏
i=1
ν(B2ǫ(xlow,i)), (B.16)
P((B.7)) ≤K!
K∏
i=1
ν(B2ǫ(xup,i)). (B.17)
Suppose ǫ is sufficiently small so that B2ǫ(xlow,i) for i = 1, ...,K are distinct sets. Under As-
sumption 3, it is enough if ǫ ≤ (C/K)1/s/2. Under Assumption 3, ν(B2ǫ(xlow,i)) ≤ (2ǫ/C)s and
ν(B2ǫ(xup,i)) ≤ (2ǫ/C)s for any i = 1, ...,K. Note that the probability mass that is moved from ν
to µ is at most TV(κ, κ′). There exist αi ≥ 0 satisfying
∑K
i=1 αi = 1 such that for any i = 1, ...,K,
µ(B2ǫ(xlow,i)) ≤ ν(B2ǫ(xlow,i)) + αiTV(κ, κ′).
Thus, we have
P((B.6)) ≤K!
K∏
i=1
(ν(B2ǫ(xlow,i)) + αiTV(κ, κ
′))
≤K!
((
2ǫ
C
)s
+
TV(κ, κ′)
K
)K
. (B.18)
The same bound holds for P((B.7)). Substituting these bounds into Eq. B.2 yields
Adv(Φ;µK , νK) ≤W (µ
K , νK)
2ǫ
+ 4K!
((
2ǫ
C
)s
+
TV(κ, κ′)
K
)K
. (B.19)
Setting ǫ = (C/K)1/s/2 yields the claim.
C Bootstrap-type Estimator
In real-world data, the computational scalability of the stealthily biased sampling can be a bottle-
neck: it requires O˜(N2.5) time for the dataset of size N using a general minimum-cost flow solver.
Empirically, we observed that solving the problem for N ≥ 10, 000 tends to be computationally
prohibitive. Here, we consider a bootstrap-type estimator to bypass the prohibitive computation.
In the every round of the bootstrap, we sample N ′ points D′ out of the N points in the dataset D,
i.e., D′ ⊆ D and |D′| = N ′. We solve the minimum-cost flow problem only on the subset D′ and
obtain a measure µ′. Finally, we average the measures µ′ obtained in the every bootstrap round as
the estimated measure µ. If we take N ′ in a reasonable size (e.g. around a few thousands), this
estimation is sufficiently efficient, without much loss on the estimation accuracy. The bootstrap step
can be easily parallelized to speed up the computation further.
In the Adult data experiment in Section 5, we set the sample size N ′ = 4, 000 and the number
of bootstrap steps to be 30.
D Synthetic Example: Additional Results
Here, we present additional results for the synthetic data experiment in Section 5.1.
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D.1 Results in higher dimensional settings
We conducted additional experiments by changing the dimensionality d of the feature x to d = 2, 5,
and 10. The results are shown in Figures D.1, D.2, and D.3. Those results also support our key
observations R1, R2, and R3 in Section 5.
D.2 Stochastic decision-maker
Here, we demonstrate that the stochastic decision-maker can be far evil than the deterministic
decision-maker. That is, by using the stealthily biased sampling, the stochastic decision-maker can
choose the ratio of positive decisions α in sampling almost arbitrary. We show that even if the
decision-maker make such an intense sampling, the detector cannot detect the fraud of the decision-
maker. For the experiment, instead of the criteria (5.1), we consider the decision-maker that makes
the decision based on the probability
P(y = 1 | x, s) = x1 + bs, (D.1)
where b ≥ 0 is a constant. The setup of the experiment is the same as Section 5.1 except for the
criteria of the decision-maker.
Result We set the parameters in (D.1) with b = 0.2, which makes the DP of the decision-maker to
be 0.2. We run the experiment 100 times while requiring P(y = 1 | s = 1) ≈ P(y = 1 | s = 0) ≈ α for
a predetermined ratio of positive decisions α ∈ [0, 1]. The results are summarized in Figure D.4. The
figures indicate similar tendencies as we have already observed in the deterministic decision-maker
in Section 5.1. One significant difference is that the stealthily biased sampling marked low rejection
rates in a very wide range of α in sampling. In the deterministic case, as shown in Figure 5.1, α = 0.6
was the only choice for the decision-maker to pretend to be fair safely. In the stochastic case, the
decision-maker can choose arbitrary α between 0.25 and 0.95. The results indicate that, even for
such an intense sampling, the detector cannot detect the fraud of the decision-maker.
Discussion The high effectiveness of the stealthily biased sampling in the stochastic decision-
maker can be explained as follows. Suppose the original dataset D follows a distribution P (y, x, s),
and the target distribution we want to attain in the sampled dataset Z ⊆ D be Q(y, x, s). Recall
that P (y, x, s) = P (y | x, s)P (x, s) and Q(y, x, s) = Q(y | x, s)Q(x, s). In the deterministic case,
the decision criteria is given by (5.1) which indicates P (y | x, s) = Q(y | x, s). Hence, to modify
the distribution P (y, x, s) to the target distribution Q(y, x, s) through sampling, we need to modify
Q(x, s) from P (x, s). Thus, the distribution change from P (x, s) to Q(x, s) can be detected by using
the detector’s data D′ ∼ P and the two-sample test between P (x, s) and Q(x, s). To fool the two-
sample test and avoid the high rejection rate, we need to minimize the modification and keep Q(x, s)
close to P (x, s) as much as possible. This is the reason why the available ratio of positive decisions α
is limited in the deterministic case. If α is far from the true ratio of positive decisions in D, we need
a large modification on Q(x, s), which makes it difficult to pass the two-sample test. By contrast, in
the stochastic case, we have a chance to modify Q(y|x, s) from P (y|x, s) through sampling. We can
therefore modify the distribution P (y, x, s) to Q(y, x, s) while keeping Q(x, s) ≈ P (x, s) by using
the stealthily biased sampling, which makes it easy to pass the two-sample test. This is the reason
why the stealthily biased sampling is highly effective in the stochastic case. This fact implies that,
if the decision-maker is interested in pretending to be fair, making stochastic decisions helps.
E Real-World Data: Full Results
Here, we show the full results we omitted in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 due to the space limitation.
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E.1 COMPAS Data: Setup
For the first real-world data experiment, we focus on the COMPAS dataset [3].10 The COMPAS
dataset contains several defendant’s records obtained from the Broward County Sheriff’s Office in
Florida. Each defendant is scored his or her risk of recidivism using a software called COMPAS.
ProPublica [3] revealed that the COMPAS risk score is discriminative: it tends to score white
defendants with low scores while scoring black defendants with high scores.
Because Florida had strong open-records laws, the entire COMPAS dataset was made public
and the bias in the COMPAS risk score was revealed. Here, we consider a virtual scenario that
the decision-maker was aware of the bias in the risk score, and he wants to pretend to be fair by
hiding the bias. To attain this goal, the decision-maker discloses a subset of the COMPAS dataset
as evidence that the COMPAS risk score is fair.
Data We used the same data preprocessing following the analysis of ProPublica [3], which results in
eight features x ∈ R8 of each defendant, with race as sensitive attribute s ∈ {0(black), 1(white)}, and
the decision y ∈ {0(low-risk), 1(middle/high-risk)}. The preprocessed data includes 5, 278 records,
which we randomly held out 1, 278 records as the referential dataset D′ for the detector. From the
remaining 4, 000 records D, we sampled 2, 000 records as Z using both the stealthily biased and
case-control sampling. To reduce the DP in the sampling, we required the sampled set to satisfy
P(y = 1 | s = 1) ≈ P(y = 1 | s = 0) ≈ α for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Detector The detector tries to detect the bias in the disclosed dataset Z by comparing its dis-
tribution with the referential dataset D′. In the experiment, we adopted the Wasserstein distance
(WD) as the detector’s detection criteria.11 If the WD between Z and D′ is sufficiently large, the
detector can detect the bias in Z, and thus the fraud of the decision-maker is revealed.
E.2 COMPAS Data: Results
We repeated the experiment 100 times by randomly changing the data splitting, and summarized the
results. The full results of the COMPAS data experiment is shown in Figure E.1. The figures now
include the WDs on P(x | s = 1) and P(x | s = 0) addition to Figure 5.2. As the baseline without
any biased sampling, we computed DP and the WD for randomly sampled 2, 000 records from D,
which are denoted as Baseline in the figures. The results indicate the success of the stealthily biased
sampling.
E.3 Adult Data: Setup
As the second real-world data experiment, we used the Adult dataset [7]. The Adult dataset contains
48,842 records with several individual’s features and their labels (high-income or low-income). The
dataset is known to include gender bias: in the dataset, while 30% of the male have high-income,
only 10% of the female have high-income. The DP of the dataset is therefore 0.2. If we naively train
a classifier using the dataset, the resulting classifier inherits the bias and becomes discriminative,
i.e., the classifier favors to classify males as high-income. The goal of this experiment is to show that
as if the biased classifier is fair by disclosing a part of the dataset with classifier’s decision.
Data & Classifier In the data preprocessing, we converted categorical features to numerical
features.12 We randomly split 10,000 records for the training set, 20,000 records for the test set, and
10https://github.com/propublica/compas-analysis
11In COMPAS and Adult experiments, we did not adopt the multi-dimensional two-sample tests because they were
too weak.
12We used the implementation used in https://www.kaggle.com/kost13/us-income-logistic-regression/notebook
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the remaining 18,842 records for the referential set D′ for the detector. In the experiment, we first
train a classifier using the training set. As a classifier, we used logistic regression and random forest
with 100 trees. We labeled all the records in the test set using the trained classifier and obtained
the dataset D with the classifier’s decision. We then sample the subset Z ⊆ D with size |Z| = 2, 000
using both the stealthily biased and case-control sampling. To reduce the DP in the sampling, we
required the sampled set to satisfy P(y = 1 | s = 1) ≈ P(y = 1 | s = 0) ≈ α for a predetermined
ratio of positive decisions α ∈ [0, 1].
Detector We adopted the same detector as the COMPAS data experiment, who refers to the WD
as the bias detection metric.
E.4 Adult Data: Results
We repeated the experiment 100 times by randomly changing the data splitting, and summarized
the results. As the baseline, we computed the DP and the WD for randomly sampled 2, 000 sampled
records from D, which are denoted as Baseline in the figures.
Logistic Regression We show the full results of the Adult data experiment in Figure E.2. The
figures now include the WDs on P(x | s = 1) and P(x | s = 0) addition to Figure 5.3. The results
indicate the success of the stealthily biased sampling.
Random Forest We show the results for the random forest on the Adult data experiment in
Figure E.3. The results were almost the same as logistic regression.
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Figure D.1: [d = 2] The results for the decision-maker with a = 0.2: The shaded regions in (a)
denotes the average DP ± std. The shaded regions in (b), (c), and (d) denote 95% confidence
intervals. The dotted line in (b), (c), and (d) denotes the significance level 0.05.
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Figure D.2: [d = 5] The results for the decision-maker with a = 0.2: The shaded regions in (a)
denotes the average DP ± std. The shaded regions in (b), (c), and (d) denote 95% confidence
intervals. The dotted line in (b), (c), and (d) denotes the significance level 0.05.
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Figure D.3: [d = 10] The results for the decision-maker with a = 0.2: The shaded regions in (a)
denotes the average DP ± std. The shaded regions in (b), (c), and (d) denote 95% confidence
intervals. The dotted line in (b), (c), and (d) denotes the significance level 0.05.
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Figure D.4: Results for the stochastic decision-maker with b = 0.2: The shaded regions in (a) denotes
the average DP ± std. The shaded regions in (b), (c), and (d) denotes 95% confidence intervals.
The dotted line in (b), (c), and (d) denotes the significance level 0.05.
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Figure E.1: Results for the COMPAS dataset: The shaded regions in (a) denotes the average DP ±
std. The shaded regions in (b), (c), and (d) denote the average WD ± std.
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Figure E.2: [Logistic Regression] Results for the Adult dataset: The shaded regions in (a) denotes
the average DP ± std. The shaded regions in (b), (c), and (d) denote the average WD ± std.
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Figure E.3: [Random Forest] Results for the Adult dataset: The shaded regions in (a) denotes the
average DP ± std. The shaded regions in (b), (c), and (d) denote the average WD ± std.
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